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FORGIVE US OUR SINS:
THE INADEQUACIES OF THE
CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
RONALD J. COLOMBO*
INTRODUCTION

One of the many common law rules to take hold in the United
States is the "clergy-penitent" privilege.' An evidentiary rule, the
clergy-penitent privilege protects from revelation evidence concerning
a penitent's communication with his cleric. Simultaneously, the First
Amendment to the Constitution addresses the interaction of church
and state via the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, raising the following question: to what extent is the common law clergypenitent privilege abrogated or expanded by the First Amendment?
This Note will demonstrate that, as understood by most courts
and legislatures, the clergy-penitent privilege does not conform completely to the requirements of the First Amendment. As a result, the
privilege at times violates the Amendment's Establishment Clause by
unduly preferencing religion. Additionally, at other times the privilege's protections are insufficient, offending the notions of religious
liberty and tolerance upon which both the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause were built.
A vivid example of the inadequacies of the current system is provided in Commonwealth v. Kane.2 In Kane, a Roman Catholic priest
refused to testify to communications the defendant made to him,
although the defendant had waived his rights to the privilege and consented to the disclosure of the communications in question. 3 The defendant's position was that he had confessed nothing inculpatory, and
he wanted the priest to corroborate this.4 The court held that the
right to assert the privilege was the defendant's and that the priest's
refusal to testify after the defendant's waiver was unlawful.5 The
* I would like to thank Professor Christopher L Eisgruber and the members of the
New York University Law Review for their assistance regarding this Note.
1 I use the term "clergy-penitent" privilege, rather than the more traditional term

"priest-penitent" privilege, because it provides a more accurate description of the privilege, which is nondenominational in nature.
2 445 N.E.2d 598 (Mass. 1983).
3 See id. at 602.
4 See id. at 603.
5 See id.
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priest in Kane was held in contempt for refusing to violate the dictates
of his religion, which forbade him from revealing the confidences
made to him. 6 While the court correctly construed the clergy-penitent
privilege statute7 it was faced with, its decision makes clear the inadequacy of the privilege alone; under such a regime, clergy face court
sanctions for adhering to the tenets of their faiths.
The solution to such problems lies in constructing a constitutionally sound clergy-penitent evidentiary privilege, while accommodating
clergy whose religions prevent them from testifying under certain circumstances (hereinafter referred to as a "clergy testimonial accommodation"). A constitutionally sound privilege would allow penitents,
and penitents alone, to bar the introduction of confidential statements
made by them to members of the clergy. This privilege would extend
to testimony from both the penitents themselves and others regarding
the communications in question, and would be available to penitents
regardless of their particular religious beliefs or obligations. A clergy
testimonial accommodation would permit clergy, and clergy alone, to
refrain from testifying to communications that their religions bind
them to keep silent. This accommodation would operate regardless of
the penitent's desires.
Part I of this Note will discuss evidentiary privileges in general
and the clergy-penitent privilege in particular. Part II will examine
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause and discuss religious accommodations. Part III will apply the
common law principles discussed in Part I and the First Amendment
principles discussed in Part II to the clergy-penitent privilege. This
application will expose the inadequacies of the privilege as commonly
understood. Thereafter, Part III will offer a clergy-penitent privilege
and a clergy testimonial accommodation that are consistent with these
principles and result in a regime of protection for clergy-penitent communication superior to the one currently in place.
I
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES AND THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE

A. Evidentiary Privileges
Privileges are exceptions to the general duty of witnesses to testify, reflecting society's belief that some values are "sufficiently important.., to outweigh the need for probative evidence."'8 Unlike other
6

See id.

7

See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20A (1962).

8 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). See generally McCormick on Evi-

dence § 72 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
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evidentiary rules, privileges do not facilitate factfinding, but rather
pose an obstacle to the factfinding process, justified on public policy
grounds. 9 For this reason, experts generally agree that privileges
should be cautiously promulgated and narrowly construed in order to
minimize the burdens they impose upon the adjudicatory process.10
Originally grounded in the common law, most privileges have
been codified by statute over time."1 Privilege recognition has traditionally required, and continues to require, (1) an "'imperative need
for confidence and trust"' between the communicants, and (2) the
promotion of "'public ends.' '' 3 Consideration of these factors together answers the critical inquiry whether the relationship and communication in question are "sufficiently important" to justify an
obstacle to the truth-seeking process. The fact that a communication
9 See McCormick, supra note 8, § 72 (noting that privileges reduce information available to courts, thereby burdening the truth-seeking process).
10 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50-51 (1980) (noting that privileges "must be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth'" (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))); see also McCormick, supra
note 8, § 74 (privileges should be construed "no more broadly than necessary to accomplish their basis purposes"); 8 John IL Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2192
(McNaughton rev. vol. 1961) (privileges "should be recognized only within the narrowest
limits required by principle").
11 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923,1930 (1996) (discussing statutory recognition of psychotherapist privilege by states); see also McCormick, supra note 8, § 75 (discussing state codification of privileges).
12 Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
13 Id. at 1929 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). The
traditional expression of the requirements needed for privilege recognition were set forth
in 8 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2285:
(1) The communications must originate with the expectation that they will not
be disclosed.
(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one that, in the opinion of the community, ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal
of litigation.
In recent times, privacy rationales have been advanced to justify the recognition of
evidentiary privileges. See generally Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of
Privileged Communications, in Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1471, 1481-83 (1985). Under the privacy rationale, a witness's privacy interest would be balanced against society's interest in compelling disclosure to ascertain the
truth. Such an approach essentially reduces the analysis to a cost-benefit test, and readily
folds into Wigmore's traditional approach and the approach taken by the Supreme Court
in Trammel. See id.
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was made in confidence, while necessary to a privilege's recognition, is
14
not, by itself, a sufficient ground for such recognition.
Once recognized, a privilege is defined by two variables: the parameters of the communication covered by the privilege and the identity of the party who possesses or "holds" the privilege.15 The
communication covered by the privilege is that which the privilege
identifies as protected from revelation in court. The possessor or
holder of the privilege is the person who has the authority to invoke
the protection of the privilege. 16 Possession of a privilege vests in the
person with the "interest or relationship fostered by the particular
privilege," regardless of whether he is a plaintiff or defendant in the
action at hand. 17 Thus, only the possessor of a privilege can invoke
the privilege to preclude testimony, either his own or someone else's;
the witnesses and parties to the lawsuit themselves have no say in the
matter.
Most jurisdictions today recognize an array of privileges.18 These
include the most common privileges: the attorney-client privilege, the
marital privilege, medical privileges, and the clergy-penitent privilege.
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest evidentiary privileges available, and its recognition as a privilege has never been questioned. 19 The privilege is held by the client and protects only
communication regarding legal advice. 20 The privilege has been justiSee 8 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2286.
15 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51; see also United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153,1167
(5th Cir. 1985).
One who wishes to assert the attorney-client privilege bears the burden of
proving... that the asserted holder of the privilege made the communications
as to which the privilege is asserted to one acting as a lawyer, and that the
communications were made for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding.
Id. (citations and internal quotes omitted).
16 See McCormick, supra note 8, § 73.1.
17 Id. See, e.g., United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1583 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that psychotherapist-patient privilege could only be asserted by actual patient and not
by government on his behalf).
18 Some of the privileges, however, fail to measure up to the requirements for privilege
recognition indicated above. See Introduction: The Development of Evidentiary Privileges in American Law, in Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1454, 1457-58 (1985) (noting that certain modem privileges are "unsupported" by traditional common law justifications); McCormick, supra note 8, § 75 (same); 8
Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2286 (same). Medical privileges are often attacked on these
grounds. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
19 See Attorney-Client Privilege, in Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1501, 1502-04 (1985) [hereinafter Attorney-Client Privilege]
(summarizing history and discussing theories of attorney-client privilege).
20 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (noting that attorney-client
privilege "protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice").
14
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fled on both traditional grounds21 and on the right of individuals to
avoid self-incrimination. 2
The marital privilege, like the attorney-client and clergy-penitent
privileges, is a long recognized privilege under the common law.P
The spouse who has been called as a witness holds the privilege, contrary to the usual rule of privilege possession that grants possessory
interest in the person who bespoke the statements in question.2 4 The
privilege requires that the parties to the communication be legally
married, and protects only communication that the married couple intended to remain confidential between them.a As with other privileges, the marital privilege is justified on both traditional and privacy
grounds 26
The physician-patient privilege and its progeny (the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the social worker-client privilege, etc.) did not
exist at common law.27 Instead, the physician-patient privilege became the first statutorily recognized privilege in the United States
when New York passed legislation covering it in 1828. s The patient
possesses this privilege, which usually covers only his communication
regarding medical treatment. 29 Although sometimes justified on
21 That is, the privilege has been held to comport with the requirements set forth by
Wigmore and more recently summarized by the Supreme Court in Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40,51 (1980). See supra note 13 (supplying the four traditional factors set

forth by Wigmore).

22 See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 19, at 1502 (discussing Blackstone's support for attorney-client privilege on right to avoid self-incrimination).
23 See John C. Bush & William Harold Temann, The Right to Silence: Privileged
Clergy Communication and the Law 47-54, 99 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing traditional common law privileges).
24 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53. This unorthodox variation arises from the unique historical development and modem day application of the privilege. Only the husband, who
could bar his wife from testifying against him on the grounds that she had no separate legal
existence, originally held the privilege. See id. at 44. In more modem times, the privilege
has been granted to both husband and wife. See id. The Court in Trammel found it unreasonable to allow the privilege to operate as it had in the past, when a defendant-spouse
(husband or wife) could prevent the witness-spouse from testifying, regardless of the witness-spouse's desire to testify. See id. at 51-52. Consequently, the Court vested possession
of the privilege in the witness-spouse, who may freely choose whether to testify against the
defendant-spouse. See id. at 53.
25 See SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (listing requirements for assertion of marital privilege).
26 See Graham C Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 93 (2d ed. 1987)
(discussing justifications for the spousal privilege).
27 See Medical and Counseling Privileges, in Developments in the Law-Privileged
Communications, 98 Harv. L.Rev. 1530,1530,1532 (1985) [hereinafter Medical and Counseling Privileges] (discussing origins of physician-patient privilege).
28 See id. at 1532.
29 See Taylor v. REO Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699,703 (10th Cir. 1960) (noting that only
statements "'germane to the physician's diagnosis and treatment of the patient'" are covered by privilege (quoting Estate v. Davis, 212 P.2d 322, 328 (Kan. 1949))).
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traditional grounds, medical privileges are more often attacked on
these same grounds by critics who believe that the costs of the privileges outweigh their benefits. 30 Consequently, medical privileges are
now defended mostly under a privacy rationale. 31
B. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege
The clergy-penitent privilege, like the attorney-client and marital
privileges, has its roots in English common law.32 These roots can be
traced from the canons of the Roman Catholic Church, which considered the seal of the confessional inviolate. 33 This privilege lost its recognition following the Protestant Reformation in England.34 As a
See Medical and Counseling Privileges, supra note 27, at 1543-44.
See id. at 1544 ("With the erosion of support for the traditional utilitarian justification for the physician-patient privilege, an alternative justification for the ... [medical
privileges] has begun to emerge-one that defends the privileges as necessary to protect
the privacy of the patient."). But see Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-30 (1996)
(applying Wigmore's traditional utilitarian test in support of psychotherapist privilege).
32 See Bush & Tiemann, supra note 23, at 47-54, 99 (noting that traditional common
law recognized clergy-penitent, attorney-client, and spousal privileges).
33 See id. at 48-49 (discussing "inviolability of the seal of confession" in Roman Catholicism). The Sacrament of Reconciliation (the requirement that Catholics confess their sins
to their priests) and the secrecy surrounding the confessional, has been integral to Roman
Catholic doctrine since the early days of the Church. See id. at 41-42 (discussing New
Testament biblical origins of confession and notions of confessional secrecy within apostolic church). In the Fifth Century, Pope Leo I acknowledged the longstanding tradition of
confessional secrecy and "'plainly and unequivocally demand[ed] only secret confession
and strict silence on the part of the confessor."' See id. at 42-43 (quoting Bertrand
Kurtscheid, A History of the Seal of Confession 43-44 (1927)). This position was codified
into the Canon Law by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, and remains a part of Roman
Catholic Canon Law to this day: "The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime
for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for any
reason." Id. at 44-45 (quoting 1983 Code c.983, § 1 for evidence of modem day use). See
also Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Confidentiality Obligation of Clergy From the Perspective of Roman Catholic Priests, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1733,1734 n.4 (1996) (noting codification of Church's "longstanding teaching and practice" regarding confessional secrecy in
1215). In England before the Reformation, there was a "very close connexion" between
Church and State, and many laws were "purely ordinances of religious observance enacted
by the State." Bush & Tiemann, supra note 23, at 48 (quoting Richard S. Nolan, The Law
of the Seal of Confession, in 13 The Catholic Encyclopedia 649 (Charles G. Herbermann et
al. eds., 1912)). Since Roman Catholicism was the national religion of England before the
Reformation, the Catholic seal of the confessional naturally carried over into English common law, where the clergy-penitent privilege was recognized as absolute. See id. at 49.
34 See Bush & Tiemann, supra note 23, at 111 ("The commentators on the law of evidence generally agree that after the Restoration, the common law recognized no right of
privileged communications to clergy."). The Crown's abandonment of Catholicism led
English laws away from their Catholic foundations and influences. The Anglican Church,
which supplanted the Roman Catholic Church, began this process with regard to the
clergy-penitent privilege by holding, first, that confession was voluntary and, second, that
exceptions existed to the seal of the confessional. This ultimately led to Parliament's decision to rescind the Seal of the Confessional in the Seventeenth Century, and the English
courts dutifully ceased to recognize it. See id. at 55-59.
30
31
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result, the common law that the United States inherited did not include the clergy-penitent privilege 35 Ultimately, however, all fifty
states and the federal government have come to recognize the privi-

36
lege, although on different grounds
State courts recognized the clergy-penitent privilege first as mandated by the Constitution and subsequently via statutory enactment. 7
In the federal court system, the clergy-penitent privilege was recognized through the application of common law principles, a practice
that was ultimately codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Today every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes some form of
the privilege;39 the key variables upon which jurisdictions differ are
35 See id. at 99, 102 (noting that America's inherited common law recognized only two
privileges: attorney-client and spousal immunity).
36 See id. at 102 (noting that common law's refusal to recognize clergy-penitent privilege was overturned by statutory enactments in all 50 states); see also Mary Harter
Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 Minn. L Rev. 723, 739 (1987) (discussing federal
courts' eventual recognition of clergy-penitent privilege based on common law principles).
37 See, e.g., People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (unpublished 1813). In this seminal
case, a New York court held that a Roman Catholic priest could not be compelled to testify
about information he obtained through the Sacrament of Reconciliation on grounds that
doing so would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See Bush &
Tiemann, supra note 23, at 116 (discussing Phillips); see also Mitchell, supra note 36, at
737-38 (discussing development of clergy-penitent privilege in New York and other states).
38 See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275,280-81 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring) (recognizing existence of clergy-penitent privilege under common law); see also
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (acknowledgimg existence of clergy-penitent privilege). In 1972, the Supreme Court approved, by a vote of 8-1, proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 506, which afforded federal recognition to the clergy-penitent privilege.
See Mitchell, supra note 36, at 739. While Congress ultimately rejected Rule 506, see 26
Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5611
(West 1992) (discussing statutory history of rejected rule 506), it eventually approved Rule
501, which permits federal courts to develop rules of privilege "governed by the principles
of the common law... in the light of reason and experience," Fed. R. Evid. 501.
39 See Ala. R. Evid. 505; Alaska M Evid. 506; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2233 (West
1994) (civil); id. § 13-4062(3) (West 1994) (criminal); Ark. R. Evid. 505; Cal. Evid. Code
§§ 917,1030-1034 (Deering 1986); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107 (1987 & Supp. 1996); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146b (West 1991); Del. R. Evid. 505; D.C. Code § 14-309 (Michie
1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90505 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); Ga. Code Ann. § 38-419.1
(Harrison 1981 & Supp. 1989); Haw. R. Evid. 506; Idaho Code § 9-203(3) (Michie 1990 &
Supp. 1997); 735 IlL Comp. Stat. 5/8-803 (West 1992); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-1-14-5 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1997); Iowa Code Ann. § 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-429 (1965); Ky. R. Evid. 505; La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 511 (West 1995); Me. R. Evid.
505; Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-111 (Michie 1989); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
233, § 20A (West 1986); Mich. Comp. Laws §6002156 (West 1986); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 595.02(1)(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1997); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 491.060(4) (West 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1804 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 27-506 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49.255 (1996); N.L Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 330-A:16-c,
516.35 (Michie 1997); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A84A-23 (West 1994); N.M. . Evid. 11-506; N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4505 (ConsoL 1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (Michie 1981); N.D. R. Evid. 505;
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.02(C) (Baldwin 1994); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2505 (West
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(1) the definition of clergy, (2) the scope of the communication that
the privilege protects, and (3) the ownership of the privilege.
1.

Definition of Clergy

Twenty-three states share essentially the same definition of
clergy: "a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or of a religious denomination or religious organization."'40 The obvious effect of such a definition is to be as inclusive as

possible, only requiring that the cleric is indeed a bona fide religious
counselor. Twelve other states do not define clergy, but state merely
that the clergy-penitent privilege applies to any "clergyman or
priest."'41 The main problem with this latter approach is that it provides the courts little guidance regarding the issue of who is a cleric,
which can generate needless litigation over this issue.
Fourteen states have chosen a less flexible approach, and restrict
their definitions of clergy to members of "bona fide established
church[es] or religious organization[s]" or a similar formulation.42
1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.260 (1995); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5943 (West 1982); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-17-23 (Michie 1997); S.C. Code §19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. §§ 19-13-16 to -18 (Michie 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-206 (Michie
1980 & Supp. 1997); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 505, Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 505; Utah Code Ann. § 7824-8(3) (Michie 1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-400
(Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060(3) (West 1995 & Supp.
1998); W. Va. Code § 57-3-9 (Michie 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.06 (West 1975); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) (Michie 1997).
40 Cal. Evid. Code § 1030 (Deering 1986); see also Ark. R. Evid. 505; Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 52-146b (West 1991); Del. R. Evid. 505; Haw. R. Evid. 506; 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8803 (West 1992); Iowa Code Ann. § 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1997); Ky. R. Evid. 505; La.
Code Evid. Ann. art. 511 (West 1995); Me. R. Evid. 505; Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.
§ 9-111 (Michie 1989); Mich. Stat. Ann. §27A.2156 (Callaghan 1986); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 13-1-22 (Supp. 1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-506 (1989); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 ('West
1994 & Supp. 1997); N.M. R. Evid. 11-506; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1978); N.D. R.
Evid. 505; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 19-13-16 to -18 (1987); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 505; W. Va. Code § 57-3-9 (Michie 1997);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.06 (West 1993).
41 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 12-2233 (West 1994); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107
(1987 & Supp. 1996); Idaho Code § 9-203(3) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1997); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-1-14-5 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02(1)(c) (West 1988 &
Supp. 1998); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 26-1-801, 26-1-804 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49.255
(1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060(3) (West
1995 & Supp. 1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) (Michie 1997).
42 Ala. R. Evid. 505; see also Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 60-429 (1965); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-111 (1989); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 491.060(4) (West 1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 330-A:16-c, 516.35 (Michie 1997); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (Michie 1981); Ohio Rev,
Code Ann. § 2317.02 (Baldwin 1994); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5943 (West 1982); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 4-17-23 (Michie 1997); S.C. Code § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-203 (Michie 1980 & Supp. 1997); Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-400
(Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997).
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The effect of this is to limit the privilege to organized religion. Most
restrictive is Georgia's definition, which is limited, facially at least, to
Christian and Jewish clergy.43 As this Note discusses later, it is proper

to limit the clergy-penitent privilege to communications conducted
with bona fide clergy, but it is not proper to specify the particular
denominations of clergy covered by such privilege. 44
2. Scope of Covered Communication
Half (twenty-five) of the clergy-penitent privilege statutes create
a privilege covering "any confidential communication made to [a
member of the clergy] in his professional character." 45 Such broad
statutes encompass all confidential communication between a cleric
and a penitent, so long as the cleric is listening to the penitent in his
official capacity as a cleric. This definition does not require, however,
that the communication in question be penitential in nature. Eleven
states restrict the privilege to "statement[s] made to [clergymen]
under the sanctity of a religious confessional" or statements made
within the "course of discipline enjoined by [his] church." 46 Such a
formulation serves to protect only penitential communication made
pursuant to established denominational practices. Eight states and
the District of Columbia occupy the area in between these two positions, extending the privilege to "any confidential communication" between a cleric and a communicant, provided that such communication
is "necessary and proper to enable [the cleric] to discharge the func43 See Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-22 (Michie 1995) (definition of clergy limited to "any
Protestant minister of the Gospel, or to any priest of the Roman Catholic faith, or to any
priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic faith, or to any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian or
Jewish minister, by whatever name called").
44 See infra Part IILA.1.
45 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146b (West 1991); see also Ala. R. Evid. 505; Del. R.
Evid. 505; Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-22 (Mlchie 1995); Haw. R. Evid. 506; La. Code Evid.
Ann. art. 511 (West 1995); Me. R.Evid. 505; Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-111
(Michie 1989); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986); Minn. Sat. Ann.
§ 595.02(1)(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1997); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 491.060(4) (West 1996); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-506 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 49.255 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 330-A:16-c, 51635 (Michie
1997); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1978); N.D. R. Evid. 505; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2317.02(C) (Baldwin 1994); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 5943 (West 1982); S.C. Code § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. §§ 19-13-16 to -18 (Michie 1995); Tex.R.Civ. Evid. 505, Tex. R. Crim.
Evid. 505; W. Va. Code § 57-3-9 (Michie 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.06 (West 1993).
46 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2233 (West
1994); Idaho Code § 9-203 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1997); 735 11l. Comp. Stat. 518-803 (West
1992); Ind. Code § 34-1-14-5 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-429 (1965);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2156 (West 1986); Mont Code Ann. § 26-1404 (1997); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101 (Michie
1997).
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tions of his office according to the usual course of practice or discipline of his church. '47 This approach preserves the requirement that
the communication be made pursuant to some regular church practice, but eschews the requirement that the communication be made
within the sanctity of a formal religious confessional. None of these
approaches fully comports with the traditional understanding of privileges, since, as will be discussed later, they fail to inquire into the
cleric's obligation to maintain the secrecy of the communication in
49
question. 48 Only two states require such an obligation.
3. Holder of Privilege
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions recognize the penitent as the holder of the privilege. 50 However, four states have recognized dual ownership of the privilege, permitting the cleric to assert
the privilege unilaterally. 51 As will be discussed in Part III, clergy
ownership of the privilege is ordinarily inappropriate, even though a
52
clergy testimonial accommodation would be fully appropriate.
Most clergy-penitent privilege statutes do not comport with the
justifications discussed previously for privilege recognition. 53 While
some of these statutes are merely unwise as a matter of policy, others
arguably violate the Constitution. In fashioning a model clergy-penitent privilege in Part Ill, this Note will expound upon the defects highlighted above and discuss whether they present poor policy choices or
constitutional violations. Central to this discussion, however, is an examination of the mandates and principles of the Constitution's religion clauses.
47 S.C. Code § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1390-107 (1987 & Supp. 1996); D.C. Code Ann. § 14-309 (Michie 1995); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 90.505 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); Iowa Code Ann. § 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1997);
NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (Michie
1981); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-17-23 (Michie 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-206 (1980 & Supp.
1997); Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-400 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997).
48 See infra Part III.A.3. (discussing obligation of clergy to maintain secrecy as requirement of clergy-penitent privilege recognition).
49 Cal. Evid. Code §§ 912, 917, 1030-1034 (Deering 1986); Or. Evid. Code § 40.260
(1995); Or. R. Evid. 506.
50 Forty-six states plus the District of Columbia and the federal courts view the penitent
as the sole holder of the clergy-penitent privilege. The four states that do not are Alabama, California, Colorado, and Ohio. See Ala. R. Evid. 505; Cal. Evid. Code § 1034
(Deering 1986); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107 (1987 & Supp. 1996); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2317.02 (Baldwin 1994).
51 See supra note 50.
52 See infra Parts III.A.4. and III.B.
53 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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11
THEm FRE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
OF THE FIRST AMENDmNT

A.

The Free Exercise Clause

The Free Exercise Clause s4 of the F'rst Amendment is implicated
whenever government action adversely affects the practice of religion.55 Since laws requiring witnesses to testify without excepting evidence gleaned from religious confessions may adversely affect the
practice of engaging in such confessions, it is necessary to consider
whether these laws violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Under Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources v.
Smith,56 the Supreme Court explained that the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits the government from (1) regulating one's "right to believe
and profess" one's religious convictions, or (2) specifically targeting
and regulating one's right to engage in religious activity, absent the
showing of a compelling government interest pursued by the least restrictive means 57 Conversely, "generally applicable, religion-neutral
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice"
do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, and thus do not need to rely
on a compelling government interest pursued by the least restrictive
means in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.58 Under some circumstances, however, the Free Exercise Clause mandates that an exemption be granted to certain individuals from an otherwise valid,
religion-neutral, generally applicable law.5 9 Such exemptions are limited to those circumstances where an individual's free exercise of religion is implicated "in conjunction with other constitutional
protections." 60 As the duty to testify is a generally applicable, religion-neutral law, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. As this
duty does not implicate free exercise concerns in conjunction with
54 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added).

55 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-34
(1993) (explaining applicability of Free Exercise Clause).
56 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

57 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see also Churd of Lukumi BabahtAye, 50S U.S. at 53132 (1993) (applying Smith test in holding that ordinance directed at suppressing Santeria
religious activity was not neutral and therefore violated the Free Exercise Clause).
58 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
59 Smith recognized a "hybrid" category of situations under which the Free Exercise
Clause mandated an exemption for religious practitioners. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
Such a hybrid occurs when the Free Exercise Clause is implicated "in conjunction with
other constitutional protections." Id.
60 Id.
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other constitutional freedoms, the Free Exercise Clause does not de61
mand the recognition of a clergy-penitent free exercise exemption.

While Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause does not mandate

exemptions from religion-neutral, generally applicable regulations,
Smith did make clear that the First Amendment permits the promulgation of such exemptions by the legislature, known as "religious accommodations." 62 As with all other legislation, such accommodations
must not violate the Establishment Clause if they are to be upheld as
constitutional.
B.

The Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause 63 proscribes government legislation
that either favors religion over nonreligion 64 or favors one particular
denomination over another. 65 Either one of these Establishment
Clause strictures can potentially invalidate a clergy-penitent privilege
or testimonial accommodation. An overly broad privilege or accommodation, protecting religious communications generally, would run
afoul of the Establishment Clause's mandate that the religious not be
elevated to a preferred position over the secular; an overly narrow
privilege or accommodation, protecting only those communications
made to clergy of certain denominations, would violate the Establish61 Arguably, clergy-penitent communications touch upon speech and associational freedoms in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore qualify as a hybrid exception. However, most religious rituals implicate such freedoms, prompting Justice
Souter to proclaim that the Smith Court's hybrid exception "would probably be so vast as
to swallow the Smith rule." Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Smith's reference to other freedoms must involve something more than mere
implication, referring to those situations where other freedoms are directly abridged. Such
an interpretation preserves the internal consistency of Smith and explains the precedent
prompting the hybrid exceptions. As the rule compelling clergy and penitents to testify to
confidential communications between them does not violate free speech and associational
freedoms per se, the argument in favor of recognizing a constitutional free exercise exemption under the Smith hybrid exception fails.
62 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (interpreting Free Exercise Clause to permit legislatively
crafted exemptions to laws of general applicability). The Supreme Court invalidated Congress's attempt to overturn Smith via legislative enactment. See City of Boerne v. Flores,
117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161-62 (1997) (holding unconstitutional Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993), which mandated that state action that
infringed upon individual's free exercise of religion be justified by "compelling government
interest").
63 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S.
Const. amend. I.
64 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 251-53 (1982) (discussing Lemon test, see
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 662 (1971), for determining whether laws that favor religion
generally violate Establishment Clause principles).
65 See id. at 244-47 (discussing principle of "denominational neutrality").
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ment Clause's mandate that no particular denomination be elevated
to a preferred position over other denominations.
While situations involving denominational preferences are rather
easy to recognize, situations where legislation favors religion over
nonreligion are much more difficult to identify. The Lemon test, articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,6 6 provides the following guidelines
for determining the legitimacy of a statute suspected of unconstitutionally favoring religion over nonreligion: "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion." 67 A privilege or accommodation statute that fails this
test is unconstitutional. As shall be demonstrated, a properly drafted
clergy-penitent privilege and a properly drafted clergy testimonial accommodation would not violate the Establishment Clause.63
C. Religious Accommodations
The Supreme Court has indicated that there is "ample room" between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause for government action evincing "benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference."'69 Such action is referred to as the "accommodation" of religion. 70 Justice White's above-quoted language notwithstanding, in
practice this "ample room" can be more accurately described as a precarious line, for the Court has been quick to find that government
action regarding religion violates the Establishment Clause. 7 '
An analysis of the case law suggests that only those accommodations that remove a government imposed burden that disproportionately impacts upon the sincere practice of one's religion are
constitutional. 7 2 Put differently, the critical difference between a legit66 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

67 Larson, 456 U.S. at 252 (summarizing Lemon test) (quotations and citations

omitted).

68 See infra Parts

L.A.-B.

69 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987).
70 See id.
71 See, e.g., Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that statute exempting religious publications from sales tax violated Establishment Clause); Thornton v.

Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (holding that statute permitting religious adherents to
refuse to work on Sabbath violated Establishment Clause).
72 The Supreme Court has declared repeatedly that the "'limits of permissible state
accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.'" Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (1937) (quoting Waltz v. Tax

Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)); see also Bullock, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 ("[W]e in no way
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imate religious accommodation and the illegitimate establishment of
religion lies in the distinction between lifting a government imposed
burden that particularly impacts a specific religious group and conferring on a particular religious group a special benefit to which all other
groups (religious or nonreligious) have an equal claim. 73 An example
of a legitimate accommodation would be permitting the religious use
of alcohol in a jurisdiction that otherwise prohibits the use of alcohol.74 While all who wish to consume alcohol would be affected by

the prohibition, those who wish to consume alcohol for religious pursuggest that all benefits conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on
account of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless they are
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."). Therefore, although the Free Exercise Clause is
limited to forbidding legislation that intentionally regulates religious practice or belief and
limited to mandating exemptions from laws that implicate the Free Exercise Clause "in
conjunction with other constitutional protections," Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77, 881 (1990), religious accommodations reaching beyond these narrow parameters are permissible. However, Court precedent suggests that
such accommodations may not reach far beyond these parameters and are indeed linked to
the very conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause. In Amos, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of section 702 of the Civil Rights Act, which exempts religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition on employment discrimination. See Amos, 483 U.S. at
339. Two years later, in Bullock, the Court held unconstitutional a sales tax exemption
exclusively for religious periodicals. See Bullock, 489 U.S. at 17.
The principle that emerges is the one stated above: accommodations that lift government imposed burdens disproportionately affecting religion are permissible; those that do
not are impermissible. While a sales tax burdens the religious and nonreligious equally,
laws forbidding religious discrimination in employment decisions do not. Language in
each of these cases further supports this proposition. In Bullock, the Court noted that the
tax exemption in question "did not remove a demonstrated and possibly grave imposition
on religious activity sheltered by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 18 n.8. Conversely, the
Amos Court found that the exemption in question served to "alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their
religious missions." Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. In each of these cases, therefore, the Court
examined the conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause in order to determine
whether accommodation could be possible. Thereafter, the court examined the disproportionality of the burdens placed upon such conduct to determine whether accommodation
would be appropriate. A case that seems to violate this rule is Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,
472 U.S. 703 (1985), in which the Court held unconstitutional a statute that "guaranteed
employees the right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith." Id. at 706 n.2.
That case is readily distinguishable, however, on the grounds that the accommodation in
question was not one from a government imposed burden, but rather a special private right
created to be enforced against other private individuals and organizations. Had the
Thornton decision been limited to an examination of state employment practices, the situation would be radically different.
73 See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 249293 (1994) (holding that "the Constitution allows the state to accommodate religious needs
by alleviating special burdens... [but does not allow] an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of political power to a religious group"); cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence
G.Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245, 1282-1301 (1994) (proffering an "equal regard"
approach to religious exemptions).
74 See Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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poses would be disproportionately affected, and thus an accommodation for such use does not give preference to religion, but rather
recognizes and seeks to correct this disproportionate impact. 75
Accommodations that lift burdens disproportionately affecting
religion serve, by definition, a "secular legislative purpose" per the
first prong of the Lemon test.7 6 Furthermore, such accommodations
do not violate the second prong of the Lemon test, for they do not
have as their primary effect the advancement of religion. 77 That is, the
lifting of a burden that disproportionately affects religion does not advance religion, but rather serves to promote the equal treatment of
religion.78 The final prong of the Lemon test, forbidding excessive
church-state "entanglement," requires a more fact specific analysis,
and no blanket statement can be made regarding legislative accommo79
dations and this prong.
Finally, if an accommodation meets the Lemon requirements discussed above, it will not violate the Establishment Clause if it is
facially neutral, even if in practice it benefits one denomination more
than another.80 Returning to the prohibition example used previously, "[a] state law prohibiting the consumption of alcohol may ex75 Cf. id. Many commentators insist that the First Amendment should apply to both
religious and secular conscience. See, e.g., Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 Cornell L Rev. 490, 562-65 (1992) (arguing that Free Exercise Clause

should apply to secularly motivated action regarding "religious questions" such as abortion
and euthanasia). Under this formulation, a burden upon religious practice would not be
considered disproportionately burdensome to that placed upon conduct motivated by
deeply-held, secularly motivated values. Such an approach should be rejected, for it is
inconsistent with both the Supreme Court's current direction and the framers! intent. See
id. at 562 (noting Supreme Court's retreat from "a definition of religion that encompasses
a nonbeliever's responses to quintessentially religious questions"); Michael IV. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L
Rev. 1409, 1488-1500 (1990) (noting that framers' deliberate use of term "free exercise of
religion" over "rights of conscience" reflects intent to safeguard conduct motivated solely
by religious concerns, which were held to be "of a different order" from the secular).
76 Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 (noting that under Lemon "it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions").
77 See id. at 336-38.
78 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (noting that accommodations do not violate Establishment Clause if they "were designed to alleviate government intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of a particular faith" from
engaging in religious conduct pursuant to their faith).
79 Ct Amos, 483 U.S. at 339 (refusing to draw general inferences from accommodation's legitimate purpose and excessive entanglement prong of Lemon, despite having
done so for inquiry into first two Lemon prongs).
80 See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,2495
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that permissible accommodations could
serve to benefit only particular religious groups).
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empt sacramental wines," 81 even though such an exemption would
only serve those denominations that employed sacramental wines. A
state may not, however, "exempt sacramental wine use by Catholics,
but not by Jews ....The Constitution permits nondiscriminatoryreligious practice-exemption[s], not sectarian ones." 82 Indeed, accommodations by their very nature often affect only some, and not all,
denominations; however, the Court continues to declare that "'government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices
and... may do so without violating the Establishment Clause."83
A separate question from the constitutional permissibility of religious accommodations is the policy issue of whether accommodations
should be promulgated. Since the framers of the First Amendment
intended religion to be accommodated to the fullest extent possible, 84
and the reasons behind this intent are as relevant and as forceful today as they were in 1789,85 religious accommodations should be
promulgated freely.
The religion clauses of the First Amendment embody the framers' intent to safeguard vigilantly religious liberty. 86 In addition to
preventing the establishment or suppression of religion, the framers of
the First Amendment aspired to create a government that readily accommodated religious practice8 7 This aspiration arose from an acknowledgment of America's heritage as a religiously diverse nation 88
81 Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
82 Id. (citations and internal quotes omitted) (brackets in original).
83 Id. at 2492 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 144-45 (1987)); see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (noting that while Free Exercise Clause does not compel recognition
of religious exemption to state laws regulating use of peyote, it permits such exemptions if
promulgated by legislature).
84 See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
85 See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
86 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2185 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The Religion Clauses of the Constitution represent a profound commitment to religious
liberty.").
87 See id. at 2175 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that framers believed "'proper' relationship between government and religion" was one where religion would be accommodated); id. at 2184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that colonial governments freely
granted religious accommodations and that framers shared belief that "government should
do its utmost to accommodate religious scruples"); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2502 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
"'[g]overnment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are
an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage"' (quoting Allegheny County v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989))).
88 See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1475-80, 1513 (discussing framers' sensitivity to
religious diversity of America). See generally Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant
22-43, 73-76 (3d ed. 1966) (discussing religious diversity of colonial America).
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and from the framers' belief that under principles of natural laws9 it

would be wrong for the state to interfere with one's manner of worship. 90 As James Madison proclaimed:
"This duty [owed the Creator] is precedent both in order of time
and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society .... [E]very
man who becomes a member of Civil Society, [must] do it with a
saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain
therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by
the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt
from its cognizance."91

Modem America remains a land of great religious diversity, in
large part due to its continued role as a beacon to those fleeing religious persecution around the globe. 92 Furthermore, the framers' understanding of natural law remains an insightful view of the human
condition. 93 As such, the framers' reasons for desiring a government
accommodating to the free exercise of religion continue to be
persuasive. 94

Application of the First Amendment requirements discussed
above will demonstrate that a properly drafted clergy-penitent privilege and testimonial accommodation do not violate the Constitution.
89 Natural law
denote[s] a system of rules and principles for the guidance of human conduct
which, independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one
people, might be discovered by the rational intelligence of man, and would be
found to grow out of and conform to his nature, meaning by that word his
whole mental, moral, and physical constitution.
Black's Law Dictionary 1026 (6th ed. 1990). For a fuller explanation of natural law, see
generally Phillip Johnson, Some Thoughts on Natural Law, 75 Cal. L Rev. 217 (1987).
90 See McConell, supra note 75, at 1497-99; see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
282-83 (1901) (discussing natural rights origin of freedom of religion); Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69 Notre Dame L Rev. 1035, 1037-40
(discussing Constitution's natural law underpinnings).
91 Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 Writings of James
Madison 184-85 (G. Hunt ed., 1901)) (alterations in original).
92 See Religious Persecution. Hearing on H.R. 1685 Before the House International
Relations Comm-, 105th Cong., 1997 WL 14150583 (Sept. 9, 1997) (statement of John
Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State) (testifying that U.S. remains committed to policy of
providing asylum to those fleeing from religious persecution).
93 See Kirk, supra note 90, at 1035-36 (commenting upon vibrancy of modem natural
law scholarship).
94 While the fear of interdenominational discrimination that originally motivated the
framers may have lessened, the rise of secularist attitudes callously indifferent or outright
hostile to religion in general provides ample evidence of the need to remain sensitive to
and protective of the practice of religion. Such a scenario appeared in Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 979 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (describing following facts: government forced landlord to rent apartments
to unmarried couples, over his protestations that doing so would force him to violate his
religion by facilitating sin of cohabitation).
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Furthermore, fidelity to common law reasoning and the principles underlying the First Amendment leads to the conclusion that both the
clergy-penitent privilege and testimonial accommodation should be
recognized. Operating together, these two forms of protection for
clergy-penitent communication produce a system that is more practical, more fair, and more constitutional in letter and in spirit than the
system currently in place.
III
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

An examination of existing clergy-penitent privilege statutes and
judicial decisions reveals that, as commonly understood, the clergypenitent privilege does not always comport with the First Amendment. Furthermore, while the clergy-penitent privilege may oftentimes function as a testimonial accommodation, the "privilege" and
the "accommodation" are not necessarily synonymous, exposing the
need for a dual system of protection for clergy-penitent communication that recognizes both the clergy-penitent privilege and a testimonial accommodation. This Part will set forth a proper clergy-penitent
evidentiary privilege and a proper clergy-penitent testimonial accommodation, and explain the differences between the two. It will conclude by examining the application and interplay of the privilege and
the accommodation.
A.

A Proper Clergy-Penitent Privilege

As with all other privileges, a proper clergy-penitent privilege
statute must involve "an imperative need for confidence and trust" 95
and promotion of public ends and, of course, be tailored so as not to
conflict with the Constitution. Following these parameters, the optimal clergy-penitent privilege statute would: (1) define "clergy" as
those religious functionaries who are obliged by their religion to maintain the secrecy of confidential communications made to them; (2) be
available to all penitents, regardless of whether the penitent is under
an obligation to engage in such communication; (3) extend protection
only to confidential communication between a penitent and a cleric
made under a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (4) grant the
possession of the privilege to the penitent.
Privileges that stray too far from this model are at best unwise
and, in some cases, constitutionally suspect. Such privileges are unwise because they unnecessarily burden the truth-seeking function of
95 See supra text acompanying notes 12-13.
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the court; they are unconstitutional because they conflict with the Establishment Clause. Examples of this can be found in cases such as
Rivers v. Rivers96 and In re Verplank,97 where the courts applied the
clergy-penitent privilege to cover general counseling services offered
by the clergy, despite the lack of any religious canons requiring the
clergy in question to maintain confidentiality.98 In the absence of such
an obligation to maintain confidentiality on the part of the cleric, it is
difficult to satisfy the "imperative need for confidence and trust" requirement of privilege recognition. 99 Thus, the privilege imposes a
heavy burden upon the truth-seeking ability of the courts, unmatched
by a relationship important enough to warrant such a burden. Furthermore, the privilege's justification is questionable in light of the
fact that it does not conform to the confidentiality requirements traditionally demanded of privileges; without such a legitimate justification, the privilege arguably violates the Establishment Clause by
unduly giving preference to religion over nonreligion. 10°
1.

Definition of Clergy

The clergy-penitent privilege should extend only to those communications a person has with a bona fide cleric. This limitation arises
from the purpose of the privilege and the principle that privileges are
to be construed as narrowly as possible to achieve their purpose. 101
The purpose of the clergy-penitent privilege is to foster communication between penitents and clergy by removing the threat of disclosure from such communications. As the Supreme Court noted in
Trammel v. United States:1°2 "The [clergy-penitent] privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and
absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts
and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return."10 3 The
reason such a relation should be fostered and why the injury that
would inure to the relation by disclosure of the communications
would be greater than the benefit gained by disclosure0 4 was explained well by Jeremy Bentham:
96
97
98
99

354 S.E2d 784 (S.C. 1987).
329 F. Supp. 433 (CD. Cal. 1971).
See infra Part ILA.3.
See supra text accompanying note 12.
100 See infra Part M.A.3.
101 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
102 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
103 Id. at 51.
104 See supra note 13 (listing traditional utilitarian justifications for privilege
recognition).
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The advantage gained by the coercion [of clergy-penitent testimony], gained in the shape of assistance to justice, would be casual
and even rare; the mischief produced by it, constant and all extensive.... If in some shapes the revelation of testimony thus obtained
would be of use to justice, there are others in which the disclosures
thus made are actually of use to justice, under the assurance of their
never reaching the ears of the judge. Repentance, and consequent
abstinence from further misdeeds of the like nature; repentance, followed even by satisfaction in some shape or other, satisfaction more
or less adequate for the past: such are the well known consequences
of [clergy-penitent communication. 10 5

As communications with nonclergy do not satisfactorily advance
the aims of this privilege, such communication should not be within
10 6
the privilege's purview.

A broader definition of clergy would run contrary to the traditional, narrow form of evidentiary privileges and would impose costs
upon adjudication not matched by its benefits. For example, a clergypenitent privilege statute that defined clergy as "anyone willing to offer spiritual advice" would impose greater burdens on the adjudicatory process than the more narrowly tailored definition presented
above and would not significantly further the societal goals behind the
privilege's recognition. 1°7
Conversely, an overly narrow definition of clergy could conflict
with the Establishment Clause by favoring certain denominations over
others. The Georgia statute provides an example of this, limiting its
applicability to "any Protestant minister of the Gospel, any priest of
the Roman Catholic faith, any priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic
faith, any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian or Jewish minister, by
105 4 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 589-91 (1827); see 8 Wigmore,
supra note 10, § 2396 (adding that Bentham was ordinarily "the greatest opponent of
privileges").
106 Clergy are particularly suited to advancing the societal counseling interest central to
the clergy-penitent privilege because of their general recognition as spiritual counselors
and their training as such. See Daryl Koehn, Expertise and the Delegitimation of Professional Authority, 38 Am. Behavioral Scientist 990, 998 (1995) (indicating that seminarians
"receive 'professional' training in counseling individuals"); Richard F. Mollica et al., A
Community Study of Formal Pastoral Counseling Activities of the Clergy, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 323 (1986) (discussing counseling attitudes and practices of clergy).
107 Privileges adversely affect the ability of courts to ascertain accurately the truth, and it
is axiomatic that the broader a privilege is, the narrower the range of evidence courts can
examine in adjudicating. Offsetting these costs are the benefits that society realizes in
fostering the communications protected by the privilege. The benefits, which the clergypenitent privilege seeks to reap, are those flowing from the penitential communication of a
wrongdoer to a cleric for the purposes of spiritual advice and guidance. Any expansion of
the privilege, which causes it to protect communication outside of this, results in benefits to
society that are questionable at best, although the costs of such expansion remain unquestionably high.
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whatever name called ... "108 Under this formulation, Christian and
Jewish clergy are specifically favored over the clergy of other faiths,
thereby violating the Establishment Clause.10 9
2. Penitent's Obligation to Confess/Communicate
Penitents should not be obliged to communicate with their clergy
in order to invoke the clergy-penitent privilege." 0 None of the other
evidentiary privileges mandate that the confidential communication
engaged in be obligatory, and thus such a requirement should not apply to the clergy-penitent privilege. The implications of this, however,
are that the penitent need not even be of the same religion as the
cleric in question, nor a religious believer at all. Such implications are
reasonable and desirable, for one need not believe in the efficacy of
psychotherapy in order to invoke the psychotherapist privilege, nor
the sanctity of marriage to invoke the spousal privilege. The focus of
evidentiary privileges continually has been on the reasonable expectations of the communicant concerning the listener's ability to maintain
confidentiality, and not upon the communicant's beliefs concerning
other matters.
That the communicant need not be a religious believer does not
conflict with the privilege's purpose of fostering relationships between
individuals and spiritual advisors. As with the other privileges, the
clergy-penitent privilege embodies society's value judgment that
clergy are in a position to dispense beneficial advice that promotes
"public ends" when approached by the confessor of a wrongdoing.111
There is no reason to believe that the social utility of such beneficial
advice would only be realized when offered to religious believers; by
freely deciding to engage in communication with a cleric, the penitent
is obviously open to the prospect that such discussion might be in his
best interests and is therefore unlikely to be entirely immune to the
salutary effects of such communication. If the penitent happens to
disagree with the cleric's advice or refuses to follow it, this too should
have no effect on the operation of the privilege, as one need not agree
with or follow the advice of one's doctor, psychotherapist, or attorney
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-22 (1995).
109 See Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (holding that
Establishment Clause forbids legislation which favors one denomination over another); see
also supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., Kohloff v. Bronx Say. Bank, 233 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (Civ. Ct. 1962) (holding
that clergy-penitent privilege is available "even though the penitent is not a member of the
church to which she seeks spiritual advice").
111 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13; see also supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
108
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to invoke the privileges corresponding with communications to such
persons.
Furthermore, a decision to limit the clergy-penitent privilege to
only communications between religiously motivated practitioners and
clergy would violate the Establishment Clause by granting religiously
motivated communicants opportunities and protections not afforded
secularly motivated communicants. 1 2 This exemplifies the importance of distinguishing the clergy-penitent privilege from the clergy
testimonial accommodation. The accommodation by definition treats
religious and nonreligious individuals differently; indeed, religious accommodations are promulgated to address the different effects a law
may have on religious adherents. Conversely, evidentiary privileges
claim no such purpose for their justification and cannot distinguish
between religious and nonreligious claimants.' 13
3. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the first element justifying a privilege's recognition,114 and the privilege could not attach to communication made in

the presence of third parties. Similarly, if the circumstances of the
communication indicate a lack of concern with maintaining confidentiality, the privilege could be deemed waived.115
The confidentiality requirement imposes further limits on the
privilege: only that communication which a cleric is prohibited by the
dictates of his religion from disclosing should be deemed privileged.
In the absence of such an obligation on the part of the cleric, the privilege's claimant (the penitent) cannot argue that confidentiality was
both expected and necessary. One of the major differences between
confidential communication in general and privileged confidential
communication is that the latter usually contains some sort of guarantee of confidentiality which the former does not. For example, a
promise by a friend to keep one's communication confidential is only
that: a naked, unenforceable promise and nothing more. Such com112 In the absence of a clergy-penitent privilege, a religious accommodation for religiously motivated penitents could be promulgated. By definition, this accommodation
would apply only to religiously motivated penitents, contrary to the application of the
clergy-penitent privilege. Such an accommodation would parallel that presented in this
Note for clergy. See infra Part III.B.
113 Cf. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983) (holding tax deduction for religiously
affiliated private school expenses legitimate secular purpose because "the deduction is
available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children
attend public schools").
114 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
115 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323 (1992) (noting how "exposing
privileged evidence" can abrogate privilege).
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munication is not privileged. However, a promise by a physician, psychotherapist, or attorney to keep one's communication confidential is
more than a mere personal promise, but rather a promise backed by
professional obligations enjoining such confidentiality.1 16 In fact, of
the most widely recognized privileges, only the husband-wife privilege
does not explicitly contain this characteristic." 7 While this does not
mean that all communications in which the parties professionally
guarantee their promise to maintain confidentiality are privileged, it
does suggest that communications lacking such a guarantee of confidentiality cannot be considered privileged. As only those communications in which secrecy on the part of the cleric is required by the
dictates of the cleric's religion satisfy this requirement, only those
communications ought to be considered privileged.' 18
Eckmann v. Board of Education'19 is an example of a court mistakenly applying the privilege where there was no religious restriction
enjoining the cleric in question from disclosing the communication. In
Eckmann, the court extended the privilege to cover communications
made to a Roman Catholic nun, 20 despite the fact that Roman Catholic nuns are powerless to hear confession; therefore, the Church's obligations to maintain the silence of the confessional were inapplicable
to her. In contrast to Eckmann, In re Murtha 21 correctly noted the
inapplicability of the privilege to nuns because there is nothing "in

116 See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1981) (rule entitled
"Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client"); American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 47 Am. Psychologist 15971606 (1992) (rule regarding "Privacy and Confidentiality").
117 An argument could be made, however, that such a characteristic is present implicitly
in the exchange of wedding vows; this would explain why the privilege is not extended to
couples who live together, are "in love," or otherwise committed to each other without
being formally married. See United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 593 (1984) (noting how
marital privilege is only available to couples in a "valid marriage"). Furthermore, the
foundations of the privilege were property based, distinguishing it from all other privileges.
See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (noting that many foundations for
traditional husband-wife privilege have "long since disappeared. Nowhere in... any modem societ[y] is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal
identity.").
118 Inquiries into clergy obligations to maintain silence have been held not to violate the
excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation,
918 F.2d 374,387 n21 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that "ascertain[ing] the types of communications that the denomination deems spiritual and confidential is both a necessary and a
constitutionally inoffensive threshold step in determining whether a privilege interdenominational in nature applies in light of the facts and circumstances of a particular case").
119 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
M See id. at 72.
121 279 A.2d 889 (NJ. 1971).
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Catholic doctrine or practice" to indicate that confession to a nun
could trigger the clergy-penitent privilege.1 2
Hawaii provides an example of a statute with the same mistake.
Under this statute, all communications with clergy "made privately
and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the communication" are deemed privileged.123
As previously discussed, this serves to elevate religion over nonreligion by affording religious communication a preference to which it is
not entitled, for it does not require that the cleric be bound to silence
in order for the privilege to apply.124
4. Holder of Privilege
The clergy-penitent privilege should belong to the penitent, since
his communication is what society wishes to encourage and protect.
For this same reason, the client holds the attorney-client privilege, 125
and the patient holds the physician-patient privilege.1 26 Some statutes, such as Alabama's, fail to realize this principle, which grants
ownership of the privilege to both the penitent and the clergy.12 7 As a
privilege, the clergy ownership provision is ordinarily inappropriate
for the reasons discussed below. 1 m
B. The Clergy Testimonial Accommodation
Independent of the clergy-penitent privilege is the clergy testimonial accommodation. Statutory recognition of this accommodation
would permit a religiously motivated cleric to refuse to testify in court
on the ground that testifying would be against the dictates of his religion. Under a jurisdiction that only recognized a clergy-penitent privilege, clergy would not have this right for the reasons discussed
previously: the clergy are not the holders of the clergy-penitent privilege because theirs is not the communication protected by the privilege.' 29 While not constitutionally required, 130 this recognition is
constitutionally permissible and is essential in order to remain faithful
to the principles underlying the First Amendment. 131
Id. at 893.
Haw. R. Evid. 506.
See supra Part III.A.2.
125 See Lilly, supra note 26, § 9.5.
126 See Medical and Counseling Privileges, supra note 27, at 1534-36.
127 See Ala. R. Evid. 505.
122
123
124

128 See infra Part III.B.
129 See supra Part I.B.3.
130 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,879 (1990)
(holding that Constitution does not require recognition of free exercise exemptions).
131 See supra Part II.C.
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Under a testimonial accommodation, clergy could refuse to testify if their religions prevented them from doing so, regardless of the
intentions of their penitents.1 2 This divergence from the clergy-penitent privilege results from the different interests involved: that of accommodating the exercise of religion versus that of encouraging
potential witnesses to seek counseling. In the latter case, the focus is
on the penitent and his ability to obtain effective counseling; the personal interests of the particular counselor are irrelevant. In the former case, the focus is on protecting the free exercise of religion, an
interest that does not depend upon one's role in a particular conversation, but rather upon one's claim that the state is interfering with the
practice of religion. Therefore, unlike the clergy-penitent privilege,
the clergy may invoke the testimonial accommodation, so long as clerics can show that testifying at trial would violate the dictates of their
religion.
Although presented as an independent protection for purposes of
clarity, the testimonial accommodation for clergy can be effected by
merely amending existing clergy-penitent privilege statutes to recognize "dual ownership" of the privilege; that is, permitting both the
cleric and the penitent to assert the statute's protections. While, conceptually, the cleric does not actually have the right to assert the privilege on his own behalf, the assertion of his testimonial
accommodation is tantamount to the same thing if the privilege is
properly crafted (i.e., limited to communications made to clergy who
are religiously bound to maintain confidentiality).13 3 Care must be
taken in drafting such a statute, however, for a dual ownership provision by itself will be inappropriate if the rest of the statute is not so
properly crafted. As noted previously, Alabama has such an inappropriate dual ownership statute21 4 The inappropriateness of the statute
stems from the fact that the clergy ownership provision is not dependent upon a showing that compulsory testimony would prohibit the
free exercise of the cleric's religion. California has adopted a superior
"dual" privilege ownership approach, extending ownership of privilege to clergy as well as to the penitents, but defining clergy as only
those who are bound by religious tenets to preserve the confidentiality
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
The only difference would be that most religious accommodations contain language
permitting a "compelling interest" exception to the exemption. See, e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann.
§ 52:17B-88.2 (West 1996) (granting religions accommodation to those whose religions forbid autopsies, except in cases of "compelling public necessity"). Conversely, privileges are
usually recognized as being absolute. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (1996)
(rejecting "balancing approach" to privilege recognition).
134 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
M

133
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of the communication, 135 thereby satisfying the prerequisite elements
136
of a free exercise accommodation.
A proper clergy testimonial accommodation would not violate
the Establishment Clause for reasons discussed earlier: it removes a
government imposed burden that disproportionately impacts upon the
practice of particular religions. 137 While many might prefer not to testify at trial, the situation of a cleric who is prohibited from testifying
by the dictates of his religion presents a different kind of burden.
While the secular witness who testifies might face the unattractive
prospect of embarrassment or inconvenience, the cleric prohibited
from testifying faces the violation of his sacred duty. Accommodation
of these religious obligations, therefore, does not grant preference to
the cleric's interests, but rather addresses the disproportionately burdensome application of the law upon his practice of religion. 138
C. The Applications of a Proper Clergy-PenitentPrivilege
and Testimonial Accommodation
Under a regime of properly promulgated and understood clergypenitent privilege statutes and clergy testimonial accommodations, society would enjoy outcomes that are not only constitutionally sound,
but that also satisfy generally held notions of fairness and common
sense.

13 9

Whenever a person turns to a cleric whose religious obligations
enjoin him to silence, that person will be protected by the clergy-penitent privilege. If the cleric is not obliged to maintain silence then the
confessor will not enjoy the privilege. This is intuitively attractive because it comports with expectations and with the notion that the law
of privileges serves to recognize preexisting confidential relationships;
its purpose is not to create new confidences where none existed previously, and the Establishment Clause will not permit the creation of
new confidences on the basis of religion.
The religion of the confessor is immaterial; if the elements justifying the privilege's recognition have been satisfied, the privilege should
attach. As society's determination that its troubled members should
have counseling available to them-be it legal, psychological, or reliCal. Evid. Code §§ 912, 917, 1030-34 (West 1996).
See supra note 72.
See supra part II.C.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of "fairness," see Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamental Fairness, and the Religion Clauses, 25 Cumb. L. Rev. 247, 272-76 (1994-1995) (discussing "fundamental fairness" theories of religion clauses); Jon 0. Newman, Comment, Rethinking
Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 Yale LJ. 1643, 1646-55 (1985) (discussing legal notions of "fairness").
135
136
137
138
139
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gious-thus satisfying the "public ends" element, 140 the dispositive
factor is whether the communication demands "an imperative need
for confidence and trust." 141 A cleric who is not obliged to maintain
confidentiality by the dictates of his religion should be treated like any
other counselor in a similar situation, such as "parents, siblings, best
friends and bartenders-none of whom [are] awarded a privilege
against testifying in court." 142 Conversely, a cleric who is enjoined
from breaching the confidentiality entrusted to him more closely resembles those counselors who do enjoy testimonial privileges, and he
should likewise partake in this benefit.
Finally, regardless of the penitent's religious affiliation, a cleric
who is barred by the dictates of his religion from revealing what he
has been told by the penitent should retain an independent right to
refrain from testifying. This is necessary to afford clergy the proper
respect and toleration contemplated by the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION

Proper respect for common law reasoning and the principles behind the First Amendment to the Constitution compels the protection
of clergy-penitent communication. For the benefit of penitents, this
protection should take the form of a constitutionally sound clergypenitent privilege. For the benefit of clergy, this protection must take
the form of a religious accommodation, or a privilege taking into account the accommodation via a dual ownership provision.
However, while the Constitution probably does not require the
protection of clergy-penitent communication, it does require that once
protection is granted, it be neither too generous nor too parsimonious.
The Establishment Clause will not tolerate legislation which either unduly preferences religion generally, or which picks and chooses specific denominational practices for special favor.
Unfortunately, misunderstanding persists regarding the contours
of the clergy-penitent privilege under the Constitution, and legislatures give far too little consideration to religious accommodation concerns. As a result, clergy-penitent privilege statutes abound that
unconstitutionally restrict their application to specific denominations,
unconstitutionally extend their application to communications that
ought not be protected, or are not complemented by accompanying
religious accommodation legislation for the protection of the clergy.
140 See supra text accompanying note 13.
141 See supra text accompanying note 12.
142 Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
recognition of psychotherapist privilege).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:225

Until these shortcomings abate, defective and inadequate clergy-penitent privilege statutes will persist, and our deepest confidences, our
adjudicatory processes, our ideals of religious liberty and toleration,
and our Constitution itself will not be properly protected.
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